Sanitized live incident
Opportunistic scan
Native source identity and targetable endpoints are private.
mediumopen
- Confidence
- 96%
- First seen
- Aug 30, 1:46:34 PM PDT
- Evidence through
- Aug 30, 1:47:25 PM PDT
- AI status
- Complete
True positive98% confidence
The alert accurately identifies a rapid, opportunistic enumeration campaign against PHP/WordPress web-shell-style paths. The verified HTTP samples are bodyless GET probes assigned to the php_or_wordpress_probe category, use multiple distinct path hashes, and span roughly 5.34 seconds. Sampled outcomes are redirects or not-found responses; they establish reconnaissance but not exploitation or compromise. No process- or flow-plane event references are available in this incident to assess downstream execution or network consequences.
- Attack stage
- Reconnaissance — PHP/WordPress web-shell path enumeration
- Model
- gpt-5.6-sol · 8 evidence calls
Observed impact
- Confirmed exposure to a rapid web-shell path enumeration campaign.
- No confirmed command execution, persistence, outbound connection, data access, or other compromise consequence in the available evidence.
- Observed HTTP handling was limited to redirects and not-found responses in the verified samples.
Deterministic signals
Rapid enumeration of PHP and WordPress web-shell paths
472 observations · 12 httpExplicit uncertainty
- The incident cites no process-plane event IDs. The required process evidence query therefore could not retrieve bounded lifecycle summaries, so workload execution consequences cannot be evaluated from that plane.
- The incident cites no flow-plane event IDs. The required flow evidence query therefore could not retrieve bounded conntrack summaries, so outbound network consequences cannot be evaluated from that plane.
- HTTP status codes alone cannot prove exploit success or failure, and the bounded summaries expose response hashes and sizes rather than response content.
- The source_key is a traffic/workload cluster, not a guaranteed identity; it may represent a proxy, NAT gateway, multiple workers, or another aggregation.
- Target workload affinity is inferred from configured routing rather than an observed per-request trace edge.
Recommended actions
- Retain and monitor the source cluster for continued enumeration, follow-up requests, authentication attempts, or changes from 301/404 outcomes.
- Apply proportionate gateway rate limiting or temporary blocking if the activity continues and local policy permits.
- Verify that the probed PHP/WordPress paths are not deployed web shells and review application/file-integrity telemetry around the incident window.
- Review workload process and egress telemetry for the same time window if available outside this bounded incident, prioritizing unexpected web-server child processes and new outbound connections.
- Keep PHP/WordPress components and plugins patched, remove unused endpoints, and ensure direct access to sensitive administrative or upload paths is restricted.